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1 Introduction
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce
it (American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 16, Section 177).
This paper develops a theory which explains the tenacity of institutions, in
particular, the stability of the constitutional order of a nation state that is insti-
tutionally democratic. The paper specifically asks, what exactly is it about such a
constitution that keeps it in force for prolonged periods of time, despite challenges
that would subvert it in undemocratic directions? Insofar as liberal democracy
is positively valued, stability of democratic order has positive instrumental value.
Moreover, to the extent that sustainability of a valued order is itself valued, a so-
ciety with a stable democratic constitutional order may be a valued end in itself.
Stability of constitutional order can have the consequent influence of consolidat-
ing a democracy. In turn, agents’ expectations of persistence of current order
contribute to the stability or instability of the constitution, a relationship which is
contingent on what we identify as a specific Rule-of-Law mechanism. In this paper,
we provide a theoretical basis for distinguishing between consolidated democracies
and transient ones. Stable constitutions thus characterize consolidated democ-
racies; constitutional instability marks transient democracies. Unconstitutional
executive orders overturned by courts, as witnessed in the Trump presidency in
the United States, is an example of a consolidated democracy that resists populist
challenges. By contrast, radical constitutional amendments in Turkey under the
Erdogan leadership reflect a transient democracy.
In present-day consolidated democracies, the form that democracy takes varies
considerably, including in substantive observable details of these countries’ consti-
tutions. However, one feature that characterizes the constitutions of all consoli-
dated democracies is the foundation of legal order on the rule of law. In particular,
we show that the rule of law contained in the constitutional order is a mechanism
that implements the constitution over prolonged periods of time: by making uncon-
stitutional acts of the government more difficult to enforce, the legality requirement
under the rule of law imposes a cost on would-be violators of the constitution. In
this sense, this paper makes a contribution to the understanding of what sustains
the institution of democratic governance.
Our investigation identifies this instrumental value of rule of law in furthering
the cause of stability of constitutional order. The rule of law has other instrumental
virtues as well, as documented in the literature, including promoting a faster rate of
growth of potential output if it implements property rights rigorously (Basu, 1989,
and Naqvi, 1990, for instance), or in fostering social mobility if it implements non-
discriminatory employment practices, among others. The positive instrumental
value of the Rule-of-Law mechanism in promoting the stability of a constitution
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appears, however, to have escaped attention thus far. A deliberate purpose of
this paper is to fill this gap. The paper accomplishes this objective – at a more
practical level – by providing a theoretical explanation of the empirical distinction
between consolidated and transitory liberal democracies.
In constitutional liberal democracy,1 institutions constrain the set of policies
that a government may implement while they also bestow on the government ex-
ecutive powers which it could conceivably use to pursue its preferred policies in
violation of legal constraints. The question, then, is whether institutions also pro-
vide safeguards against such an abuse of power by the rulers. While ultimately the
legal order needs to be defended by actions, institutional safeguards can support
constitutional outcomes. We show that in a consolidated democracy, that is a
democracy which citizens expect to be there in the long run, the legality require-
ment under the rule of law creates incentives for lawful behavior of the government
also in the short run: under the rule of law, a law-abiding government will not
enforce unlawful acts. So a government which wants to ensure that its acts are
enforced by a successor government has to abide by the legal order. Once it has
been in violation, it may find it in its best interest to reinstate the legal order,
contributing to its own punishment for the initial violation. Expectations of agents
that the legal order will ultimately prevail may thus be self-fulfilling.
Our argument highlights the importance of a shared belief in the permanence
of constitutional order for constitutional stability. Slovik (2008) has shown that
the conditions for democratic survival are fundamentally different in a subset of
democracies - consolidated democracies by induction - as opposed to unconsoli-
dated or transitional democracies. Our paper offers a theoretical argument of what
sets a consolidated democracy apart. It also explicates an institutional mechanism
in support of constitutional stability in consolidated democracy. Would-be author-
itarians who want to replace institutionally bound rule with personalized rule will
find it harder to violate constitutional rules in a consolidated democracy, unless
they manage to undermine the supporting expectations. Thus, the stronger the
belief in the permanence of the constitutional order, the more stable and thus the
more consolidated a democracy is. In a narrower sense our paper also contributes
to the analysis of populist challenges in some mature democracies.2
The concern with how to implement constitutional constraints is not a new
one. James Maddison, in the Federalist Papers No 10, argues that a greater
1For Huq and Ginsburg (forthcoming) the definition of constitutional liberal democracy in-
cludes elections, liberal rights and the rule of law, understood as the stability, predictability and
integrity of institutions
2Following Mu¨ller (2016) we understand populism as the claim to draw authority directly
from some popular will, implying the rejection of constitutionally imposed constraints. Absolute
monarchy is another example of personalized rule, where it was generally understood that acts
of a predecessor do not bind a monarch in any way.
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number of veto-players reduces the risk that a single ”faction” imposes their will
on the people. In the case of the United States such veto actors are the chambers of
Congress and the Supreme Court. Yet as recently seen in the Turkish Republic, the
executive, acting under emergency law, may remove cumbersome members of the
constitutional court or of parliament on made-up charges and, as a consequence,
override the constraints imposed by these veto-players.
Although ultimately it is people who need to defend the constitution, institu-
tions may support resistance against abuse of power. Weingast (1997) sees the
role of institutions in defining ”red lines” which serve to coordinate opposition
against violations by the executive. An example is the stand-off between the 45th
President of the United States and the judiciary over an Executive Order banning
citizens from seven countries from entry to the United States even with valid travel
documents. The Executive Order as it was initially issued was deemed unconsti-
tutional and was overturned by the courts. In this case the government gave in -
i.e., it did not challenge the ruling in the Supreme court - and the rule of law was
upheld.3
This example suggests that the rule of law is a part of the legal order that
needs to be defended against attempts to undermine it. We, on the contrary, show
that the rule of law stabilizes legal order itself. This is best illustrated by way
of another example: in the course of the 2016 presidential campaign, a statement
was made that raised the specter of unlawful orders being given to the military. In
response, a former senior military officer stated that the military would not carry
out unlawful orders.4 This position is in line with an amendment to the code of
conduct for US military personnel introduced under the Carter administration in
the US which states that soldiers have to execute only ”lawful” orders.5 Because
military personnel cannot be punished - under the law - for not executing such
orders, this rule implements a mechanism by which compliance with lawful, and
non-compliance with unlawful, orders is enticed.
The rule of law, understood as the requirement that laws, or acts of the gov-
ernment, may not be in contradiction to constitutional norms is an integral part
of the liberal constitutional order.6 In our formal analysis, we treat the legal or-
3See, e.g., The Independent, ”Trump’s ’Muslim Ban’ Block Shows that He Will Not Always
Get His Own Way,” February 5, 2017.
4Financial Times, ”US Military Chief Rejects Donald Trump’s Anti-Terror Rhetoric,” March
18, 2016.
5We are grateful to Michael Chwe for making us aware of the relevance of this rule to our
paper.
6While generally the rule of law comprises the stability, predictability and integrity of insti-
tutions (see Footnote 1), specific elements include the non-arbitrariness of legal practice, a set
of formal characteristics which the rules of the legal system have to fulfill and the subordination
of administration and legislature to a law possessing higher authority, on which see Phillips and
Jackson (1987). In a constitutional system the constitution is a law of superior authority which
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der as consisting of two elements: an arbitrary constitutional rule, and the rule
of law which limits the enforcement of contravening acts. We assume that the
rule is immutable by legal means and that any violation of the legal order can be
clearly observed, thereby ignoring legal avenues to constitutional regression and
incremental retrogression undermining democratic norms.7 We do allow, though,
for imperfect predictions of the government’s preferences for violating the legal
order, both by the agents and the government itself. Thus, policy reversals - as
in the example of the withdrawn Executive Order - are explicitly captured by our
model.
In a political economy, we model government behavior and the behavior of
agents who are necessary for achieving the government’s objectives - to defect or
not to defect from the constitution. Upon defection, the government could choose
to return to original constitutionality in the next period. A government that seeks
to defect expects to earn a rent, the magnitude of which it only learns in the next
period, and which it earns only if it persists in its violation. Members of the civil
service and law enforcement agencies - in short agents - can refuse to contribute
but they may have to fear retribution. Because of the rule-of-law tenet in the
constitution that says that no-one is bound to obey or enforce an unconstitutional
law and because a law-abiding government will not enforce unlawful acts of its
predecessor, both government and agent’s expectations will discount the risk of
retribution actually occuring.
If expectations that there will be a return to constitutionality upon defection
are sufficiently strong, then that is, in fact, what will happen in a unique equi-
librium of a political game under incomplete information that agents have about
their assessment of the type of government they are facing, one that will defect
or one that will not. If sufficiently strong, expectations become self-fulfilling, and
effectively, a government which wants to ensure that its acts are enforced by a
successor government has to abide by the legal order. Thus, once it has been in
violation, it may find it in its best interest to reinstate the legal order, contribut-
ing to its own punishment for the initial violation by foregoing the defector’s rent.
Thus the protection from retribution granted by the rule of law combined with
a strong expectation that a law-abiding government will not enforce an unlawful
act of its predecessor, make a constitution stable, and together they consolidate
democracy itself.
puts limits to what legislation may be adopted. Following from the legality principle under the
rule of law, laws have to be legal, that is in accordance with the constitution and its principles
or, even stronger, a political ideal (Hayek, 1960, Ch. 14).
7Huq and Ginsburg (forthcoming) suggest that clear violations of constitutional norms rep-
resent the exception in constitutional regression which to some extent is owed to the elasticity of
actual constitutional norms. While the assumption of clarity on policy is an idealization of our
paper, we allow uncertainty about consequences of individual decisions.
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In our paper, an eternally lived government decides whether to abide by the
legal order, or to defect. If it violates the order, it can earn a defector’s rent,
which follows a random process. The defector’s rent reflects the government’s
perceived advantage of a violation which is exogenous to the model and depends
on the government’s preferences, the economic environment and the resistance
against the policy by voters. Non-compliance by agents in the bureaucracy or law
enforcement agencies is explicitly incorporated as an endogenous feature of our
model. The government’s defection starts with an announcement of intent. Sub-
sequently, agents decide on whether to contribute to the government’s objectives
or not. They always contribute to a lawful government but their contribution to
an unlawful government - that is a government announcing its intent to act un-
lawfully - depends on their preferences for constitutionality and the punishment
for non-compliance. After observing agents’ compliance, the government decides
whether to see through its violation of the constitution or to return to the legal
order. If it returns, it cannot collect its defector’s rent but, because under the rule
of law it is prohibited from punishing non-compliance when in the constitutional
state, it saves the cost of carrying out the punishment.
If all actors are rational, and if the ultimate cost imposed by non-compliance
exceeds the ruler’s reward from a violation, the rule of law deters violations of the
legal order. Law-abiding government behavior is supported by agents’ expectations
that ultimately the legal order will prevail and, as we show, there is a range of
defector rents for which this expectation is self-fulfilling. As a consequence, the
rule of law creates an order of the state (Maddox, 1982) which constitutes an asset
a government that is law-abiding.8
The rule of law introduces an asymmetry in how agents’ non-compliance with
an unlawful act is treated, depending on the constitutional state of the govern-
ment when the punishment may occur. By contrast, a government which is un-
constrained by the rule of law is free to punish at any stage and, thus, will be
more willing to violate the constitutional rule in the first place. Note that while
in general multiple equilibria of this game can be supported, our assumption that
government and agents act under uncertainty allows us to derive a unique equilib-
rium. Our modeling assumption that the government is eternally lived and may
switch between different constitutional states is, naturally, an idealization. Yet it
8While our stylized model uses ”illegitimate/unconstitutional government” and ”illegiti-
mate/unconstitutional order” largely synonymously, in practice the orders of a government may
be illegitimate and this illegitimacy may carry a cost even if the overall legitimacy of the govern-
ment is not in doubt. One recent example is the George W. Bush administration’s decision to
use illegitimate means to extract confessions from prisoners in the extra-jurisdictional internment
camp of Guantanamo Bay. Although the original order was carried out, it incurred a cost for
the successor government when it turned out to be impossible to get the same prisoners tried on
the mainland of the United States.
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allows for a pattern of experimentation with constitutional violations which has re-
cently been on display in a number of relatively mature democracies with populist
leaders (see, e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, Aziz and Ginsburg forthcoming).
Pech (2009) obtains similar results in the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of a
game where each government in a sequence determines their constitutional state,
thereby demonstrating that the stability-enhancing effects of the rule of law hold
more generally.
1.1 Related Work
The question of how institutions constrain political leaders is an old one. Acemoglu
et al (2012) provide a general framework in which dynamically stable states, in-
terpreted as constitutions, can be analysed. Acemoglu (2003) demonstrates how
different punishment mechanisms may deter rulers from opportunistic behavior
and enforce second-best outcomes in the absence of commitment. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) point out how political power is supported by the interplay of de
jure power - which is institutionally legitimized - and de facto power - which is
based on force. For example, the elite can credibly cede political power by mak-
ing voting institutions more inclusive because it is costly to overturn institutions
by force once they are put in place. Our own theory adds to their argument by
pointing to a particular element of institutional stability: overturning institutions
which are believed to prevail in the long term and commit future governments via
the rule of law is more difficult than overturning institutions which are perceived
to be transitional or do not include the rule of law.
Our contribution characterizes positive properties of the legal order. Therefore
it is closely related to Weingast (1997, 2005) who derives self-enforcing equilibria
in which social groups are able to coordinate against government transgressions.
Weingast refers to constitutional standards as red lines for coordinating agents’
actions against violations by the sovereign. Fearon (2011) further develops the idea
that coordination on public discontent may act as a constraint on political power.
Gersbach (2004) considers properties of a constitutional incentive contract. The
constitutional choice problem has mostly been discussed from a normative angle
although recent contributions have also focused on positive aspects.9
Our paper adds a new aspect to the analysis of populist rule as it explores
institutional incentives for the bureaucratic elite to resist or coopt a populist gov-
ernment, where populism is characterized as the willingness to ignore the institu-
tional constraints of the legal order (Mu¨ller, 2016). Here we do not focus on the
9See the overview in Voigt (1997). Examples of positive approaches are the empirical investi-
gation by Aghion et al (2004), or Michalak and Pech (2013), who set up the constitutional choice
problem in a model of autocratic-democratic succession.
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preferences of the electorate over institutions - as do Acemoglu et al (2011) who
show that electorates may accept the removal of institutional constraints on the
government. We also do not ask why politicians may choose a populist platform
as others have done: Acemoglu et al (2013) define as populist a platform which
is extreme relative to the median voter and explore when politicians in a weak
institutional environment choose a populist platform in order to signal that they
will resist being bought out by the elite. Binswanger and Pru¨fer (2012) define
as populist a policy choice in which a reelection-seeking politician puts positive
weight on voter’s opinions rather than only acting on his or her own information
on the welfare maximizing policy. They analyze an environment with boundedly
rational voters and slightly more sophisticated politicians and obtain populism in
the limit for perfectly rational politicians and voters.
Self-enforcing institutional arrangements have been recently analyzed by Gans-
Morse (2017), who shows in a transition country context that a firm’s choice of
legal strategies over illegal strategies of defending property rights depends on the
propensity of other firms to choose legal strategies, giving rise to self-fulfilling ex-
pectations for intermediate ranges of institutional effectiveness. Technically, we
introduce uncertainty over the state of the game in order to derive unique equilib-
rium applying results on global games (see Morris and Shin, 2000 and Frankel et
al, 2003).
We present the model in Section 2, including the decision problems of the
agents and the government, and highlight the issue of timing of actions. Section 3
identifies the conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists under incomplete
information in which the government returns to full legality upon violation of
law. Section 4 is concerned with the decision of a government to defect from
the constitution in the first place. Proposition 3 and a corollary contain our main
result on the deterrence effect of the rule of law. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents
Agents may be members of the civil service or of law enforcement agencies. They
have a planning horizon of two periods: in the first period they contribute to the
pay-off of the government by undertaking an activity in period t, in the beginning
of the following period t+ 1 they potentially receive a punishment. 10 Over time,
10By this assumption we we rule out complex punishment strategies against transgressions of
the government such as in Abreu (1988). Our argument is that the rule-of-law mechanism enforces
superior outcomes in the absence of such complex punishment strategies. We can relax the
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the mass of agents is stationary.
Assume the government has violated the constitution and an agent is asked to
comply with an order to carry out a task. Agents have a preference for not com-
plying with an illegitimate order that is expressed by ηi ∈ (0, 1). If she complies,
she realizes 0. If she does not comply, she realizes a benefit of ηi and a subjective
cost of (1−P i)S where S is the punishment and P i the subjective probability that
the government is not going to remain in the non constitutional state. An agent
refuses to comply and, hence, is part of the set of non-compliers with mass θ if
Φi ≡ η − (1− P i)S ≥ 0. (1)
Note that for P i = 1, no agent complies and for P i = 0, S = 1, all agents
comply. Now assume that the government has not defected. By assumption, all
agents comply. Otherwise the tasks required by an illegitimate or a legitimate
government are similar and provide a comparable pay-off to the government.11
We normalize the size of the population of agents to 1. By (1), after a defection
of the government the share of non-compliers in the entire population is
θ(P˜ , S, η˜|kt) =
∫
i|Φi≥0
di (2)
where P˜ is the distribution of beliefs P i held by agents, η˜ denominates the dis-
tribution of the parameter ηi in the population and S is the government’s choice
of punishment. From (1), θ is non-decreasing as P˜ or η˜ shifts to a stochastically
dominating distribution and is non increasing in S.
2.2 The Government
The government is forward looking and discounts future pay-offs with the discount
factor β < 1. In each period it needs to decide on its legal status at and on an
enforcement policy S.
The government receives a pay-off z from an activity for which it needs the
collaboration of agents. As we had assumed that agents engage in this activity
by default, if the government is acting within the legal order, a legal government
realizes z and incurs no enforcement cost.
assumption of finite life spans and instead focus on Markov-perfect equilibrium as in Acemoglu
et al (2012).
11For example, a law enforcement officer may be asked to enforce illegitimate or legitimate
laws which both serve the same purpose. Any preference of the government for the illegitimate
law is subsumed by the state variable k introduced below.
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A government violating the legal order can secure a benefit in the form of a
rent12 kt and is not bound by the rule of law. From the activity needing the
compliance of agents it receives a pay-off z(1− θ) and it faces an enforcement cost
C(θ, S) = θc(S) with c(0) = 0 and c′(S) > 0. For simplicity, we assume that the
choice of S does not depend on the compliance level θ and that it is optimal for
the government to set S = 1, ensuring full compliance if it is expected to persist.
We also assume that a government that persists outside of the constitution always
wants to enforce its policy for any positive θ.13 A government that returns to full
legality does not carry out its enforcement policy and incurs no enforcement cost
A straightforward motivation of our cost function is one where there is a cost
to the government in political terms: prosecuting more opponents to its policy
raises the political cost due to the greater visibility of the policy in the population
at large. It is also plausible that a mainly political cost disappears once the
government decides to return to full legality.14
The defector’s rent kt which accrues to a violating government in period t sub-
sumes all advantages - or perceived disadvantages - from violating the constitution
that are exogenous to this model. This rent kt follows a stochastic process where kt
is distributed according to a distribution function H(γ) = Pr(kt ≤ γ) with a bell-
shaped distribution function h which takes strictly positive values on the interval
(kt−1 − ∆, kt−1 + ∆) and conditional expectation E(kt|kt−1) = kt−1.15 Moreover,
we require that the government’s pay off is continuous at infinity which implies
that given the current state, the present value of the expectation of kT vanishes
as T approaches infinity, i.e. for all finite k and T →∞, βTE(kT |k)=0.
Crucially, we assume that the government cannot realize the rent immediately
but that it needs to keep violating the legal order for at least two consecutive pe-
riods. One interpretation is that it needs the collaboration of some agents outside
the inner circle of the government in order to realize the rent. So each violation
of the government consists of a period where the policy change is announced and
a consecutive period where the benefits of this policy announcement accrues. In
12The rent may be the result of seizing property or, for populist politicians, it may be a political
reward from pandering to the supporters.
13For example, a defecting government that does not enforce its policies may experience a
reputational loss from being seen as weak which a constitutional government does not face. As
this loss is only incurred out of equilibrium, we do not explicitly model it. Together, these
assumptions ensure that it does not make a difference whether the government announces its
enforcement policy S in the beginning of the period or whether citizens form their expectations
and the government decides on enforcement after observing the level of non-compliance θ.
14An alternative interpretation is that C is due to the activity of a law enforcement agency
which is not directly affected by the non-compliance problem and which adjusts its activities to
the level of non-compliance, for example by working extra hours.
15I.e. we assume H(kt−1 −∆) = 0, H(kt−1 + ∆ = 1), h(kt−1 −∆) = 0 and h(kt−1 + ∆) = 0.
This rules out the possibility of unbounded returns.
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the intervening time, agents may refuse to cooperate: the variable z captures the
cost of non cooperation. Thus, the government’s objective function is defined
recursively as
Vt = at−1atkt−1 + (1− θt−1)z − C(atS, θt−1)
+ β[atat+1kt + (1− θt)z − C(at+1S, θt) + β2Vt+2], (3)
where we have assumed that a violating government in t sets at = 1. Hence,
a government which sets at = 0 realizes C = 0 and a government only earns its
defector rent of magnitude kt−1 in t if at−1 and at both have the value 1.
2.3 Timing
At the beginning of period t, the legal status of the government in t − 1, at−1, is
common knowledge. The government learns the true value of kt−1. Agents receive
a noisy signal of kt−1 with xi the signal of agent i.
Based on xi each agent decides on whether to comply with the illegitimate order
of a government announced in t − 1. Agents generally comply with the orders of
a government which has been lawful in t− 1.
If the government has been lawful in t − 1 it decides on whether to remain
lawful or whether to announce a defection. A government which has acted outside
the legal order in t − 1 observes the level of non-compliance θ. Next it decides
on its legal status for t: if it persists, it incurs an enforcement cost C(St, θt)
and appropriates the rent kt−1. A government which returns to legality, neither
appropriates the rent nor incurs an enforcement cost.
2.4 Strategic Complements
An increase in θ decreases the government’s objective z(1 − θ) − C(S, θ), and it
makes the alternative of returning to the lawful order more attractive relative to
the alternative of persisting outside of it because returning allows the government
to cut the cost C. Recall that C increases in θ and an increase in θ makes it more
likely that the government abandons a non-legal status, i.e. P˜ shifts to the right.
Moreover, from (1) and (2), θ is non-decreasing as P˜ shifts to the right. Thus,
agents’ decisions not to comply are strategic complements.
Lemma 1. Agents’ strategies are strategic complements.
Proof. See discussion above.
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3 Government’s Choice after Defection
Say, the government has defected from the constitution in t − 1. In t it learns
its true defector rent kt−1 which is there for the government to consume provided
it continues to violate the legal order in t. As a persistent violator, it expects to
receive the continuation pay-off kt−1 + (1− θt)z −C(S, θt) + βE(V nct+1|kt−1) where
E(V nct+1|kt−1) is the continuation pay-off if in t it chooses the non constitutional
state - symbolized by the index nc - with the expectation taken at the current
information set kt−1. If it reforms, it forsakes kt−1 and receives the pay off (1 −
θt)z + βV
c
t+1 where E(V
c|kt−1) is the continutation pay-off from selecting in t the
constitutional state - symbolized by the index c. The government prefers the
constitutional over the non-constitutional path beginning in t if
βE(V ct+1|kt−1)− βE(V nct+1|kt−1)− kt−1 + C(S, θt) > 0. (4)
There is some k such that (4) is positive and the government reforms, i.e.
returns to legality, even if the realization of non-compliance is at its lower boundary
θ. On the other hand, there is k such that the government does not even reform if
everybody evades taxes, θ = 1. In the intermediate range (k, k), the switch back
decision depends on non-compliance.
Consider a truncated version of the game where T = t + 1 is the last period
where the government carries out its announced policy and its enforcement policy
is effective so that it realizes the lower boundary of θ, θ . The continuation pay-off
is V cT = z along the constitutional path and V
nc
T = z(1−θ)−C(S, θ))+E(kT |kT−1)
along the non constitutional path where E(kT |kT−1) = kT−1.16
Lemma 2. In the truncated game, there is k such that a government wants to
reform even if θ = θ and there is k > k, such that a government does not even
want to reform if θ = 1.
Proof. See part 6.1 of the appendix
In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that this lemma extends to the infinite
horizon game.
3.1 Multiple Equilibria under Common Knowledge
Under common knowledge the parameter kt can be perfectly observed by the
agents. We construct a Nash equilibrium in the following way: given the strategies
of the other agents and the government, no agent wishes to change her strategy.
16For our specification of η˜, θ = 0.
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Given the strategies of the agents, the government wishes to carry out its policy.
Focusing on equilibria in pure strategies we obtain:17
Proposition 1. Under common knowledge, the following combinations of beliefs
and strategies constitute an equilibrium in pure strategies: for k ≤ k the first
strategy profile is played: agents set P = 1, the share of non-compliers is θ and the
government returns to full legality. For k ≥ k the second strategy profile is played:
agents set P = 0, the share of non-compliers is θ and the government persists
outside of the constitution. For k ∈ (k, k): either the first or the second strategy
profile is played.
This result follows immediately from the definition of equilibrium and Lemma
2, noting that θ(P = 1) = θ and θ(P = 0) = θ. For k ≥ k a trespassing government
persists if the maximum share of agents fail to comply. For k ≤ k a trespassing
government returns to full legality even with non-compliance at its lower boundary
θ and so only a share θ of agents actually want to evade. If kt is in the intermediate
range (k,k), the government’s equilibrium strategy depends on P and the game
has multiple equilibria.
3.2 Unique Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
The assumption of common knowledge is very strong and fails to capture the
difficulty which agents would typically encounter in figuring out how other agents
respond in a situation to which they would be unaccustomed and which involves
some personal risk.18 Technically, the assumption of common knowledge results
in multiplicity of equilibria which prevents us from assigning in a systematic way
probabilities to the events, i.e. whether the government violates the constitution
or reforms. Relaxing the assumption of common knowledge removes the problem
of multiple equilibria and allows us to treat the formation of expectations over
possible events in a systematic way.19 Rather than introducing uncertainty about
the actions of other agents, we assume that agents recognize that other agents’
actions are driven not only by their preference η but also by their assessment of
the type of government they are facing, an assessment in which they commit small
errors. That is, we assume that agents cannot perfectly observe kt when they
decide over non-compliance. Instead, each agent observes a distinct signal xi of
17There is another, unstable equilibrium in which the government plays a mixed strategy, see
a similar result in Verdier and Roland (2003).
18Clague et al (1996) provide a nice description of the considerations that an army officer has
to go through when deciding on whether to challenge an autocratic regime.
19We draw on the results of the theory of global games, see Morris and Shin (2000) for an
overview. The solution of a global game coincides with the risk dominant solution of the under-
lying game.
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which we assume that it is uniformly distributed on (kt − ε, kt + ε). Agents have
a dominant strategy when they know that kt ≤ k or kt ≥ k, which is true if they
receive a signal which is less than k − ε or higher than k + ε.
In order to derive equilibrium strategies in the intermediate range agents’ de-
cisions over non-compliance need to be strategic complements throughout as es-
tablished by Lemma 1. Given k is below k, non-compliance eventually forces
government reform in (4) while the critical mass of non-compliers necessary to
fulfill (4) increases in kt:
Lemma 3. In the incomplete information game there is a critical mass of non-
compliers, φ(kt), for which the government is indifferent between reforming and
not reforming and which is strictly increasing in kt with φ(k) = θ and φ(k) = θ.
Proof. See part 6.2 of the appendix
Because non-compliance strategies are complements in the unstable region of kt
we can iteratively eliminate dominated strategies starting at the upper and lower
boundaries of the dominance regions. An agent’s strategy takes the form: do not
comply if the signal xi is smaller than a threshold ξi which in turn depends on her
preference parameter ηi. We can show:20
Proposition 2. In the incomplete information truncated game there is a unique
equilibrium point k∗ supported by a distribution of individual thresholds ξi, ξ˜, such
that k < k∗ < k and the government returns to full legality if kt < k∗.
Proof. See part 6.3 of the appendix
4 Government’s Choice to Defect or Not to Defect
Having established conditions under which a defector government wants to return
to full legality we now analyze the decision to defect from the legal order in the
first place. We determine the critical value of kt−1 for a defecting government in
the case where the noise in the citizens’ observation, ε, vanishes. As a benchmark,
we first determine the critical kt−1 at which the government deviates from the
constitution in the absence of the rule of law. Here, the government can freely
choose its constitutional status and it always enforces its policy. The government
stays constitutional if
z ≥ (1− θ)z − C + E(kt|kt−1) (5)
20Frankel et al (2003) derive a uniqueness result in a setting with finitely many types and
continuous actions for vanishing noise.
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where we have used C = C(S, θ). Because with an optimal enforcement policy
θ is realized with certainty, we can drop the expectations operator.
Let k0 be the value for which (5) is binding. Clearly, k0 > 0 for θ > 0. Also note
that for C > E(kt|kt−1) the government never violates the legal order irrespective
of whether the rule-of-law is in place or not.
Now assume that the rule of law is in operation and a government defecting in
t based on kt−1 knows that it might want to return to full legality depending on
the realization of kt. If the error term in the signal vanishes, it follows from Bayes’
rule that citizens’ prior knowledge of kt−1 does not affect their expectations after
receiving a signal of kt:
Lemma 4. For ε→ 0, the equilibrium point in the game with a prior kt−1, k̂∗t and
the equilibrium point in the game without a prior, k∗, coincide.
The following lemma is useful for solving the dynamics of this game:
Lemma 5. For ε → 0, the share of non complying agents is θ for kt−1 < k∗ and
θ for kt−1 ≥ k∗.
Proof. See part 6.4 of the appendix.
Recall that a government which has been law abiding in t − 1 decides over
its constitutional state in t after it has realized pay-offs for t and before it ob-
serves the true value of kt. Its continuation pay-off along the constitutional path
is βE(V ct+1|kt−1) and the continuation pay-off on the non-constitutional path is
βE(V nct+1|kt−1). The government stays constitutional if at kt−1
E(V ct+1|kt−1)− E(V nct+1|kt−1) ≥ 0. (6)
Denominate k∗∗ the critical value for which (6) is binding. Using k∗ and the
density function of kt for given prior kt−1, h(kt|kt−1), we can express the expected
pay-off along the non-constitutional path recursively as
E(V nct+1|kt−1) =
∫
kt<k∗
h(kt|kt−1)[(1− θ)z + βE(V ct+2|kt)]dkt
+
∫
kt≥k∗
h(kt|kt−1)
[
kt + (1− θ)z − C(S, θ) + βE(V nct+2|kt)
]
dkt. (7)
The first term on the right hand side is the pay-off in case of a return to full
legality and the second term is the pay-off in case the government persists on the
non-constitutional path. Using the result of Lemma 4 for vanishing ε, the second
term on the right-hand side of expression (7) is continuous in kt−1. In order to
15
evaluate the pay-off along the constitutional path we need to know the decision
criterion employed by future agents of the government in their decision to defect
from the constitution. For now we assume that this decision criterion is given
by the rule: defect in period s if ks−1 > k∗∗′ for s > t and stay constitutional
otherwise. Furthermore, we get
E(V ct+1|kt−1) = zct+1+β
[∫
kt≤k∗∗′
h(kt|kt−1)EV ct+2|kt)dkt +
∫
kt>k∗∗′
h(kt|kt−1)E(V nct+2|kt)dkt
]
(8)
where zct is the direct pay-off to the government on the constitutional path in
t, the first integral gives the continuation pay-off under the constitution weighted
with the probability of staying constitutional in t + 1 and the second integral
gives the contribution of income realized after defecting in t + 1. Because β > 0,
the critical value k∗∗ is governed by the difference Dt+1(kt−1) = E(V ct+1|kt−1) −
E(V nct+1|kt−1) in condition (6). We can write this difference for k∗∗′ ≥ k∗ recursively
as
Dt+1(kt−1) =
∫
kt<k∗
h(kt|·)θzdkt −
∫
kt≥k∗
h(kt|·)[kt − θz − C]dkt
+ β
∫ k∗∗′
k∗
h(kt|·)Dt+2(kt)dkt. (9)
The last term on the right-hand side can be interpreted as a lock-in effect
into the non legal state: suppose that after a defection in the beginning of t the
government realizes kt ∈ [k∗, k∗∗′). In this range a constitutional government would
not want to defect from the constitution but a government which had defected
previously wants to continue violating because it is facing an enforcement cost
(which is precise for ε → 0 plus possibly some dynamic element) in excess of the
rent k it can secure by violating the law.21 In the range (k∗, k∗∗′), Dt+2(kt) is
positive. So the lock-in-effect works as an additional deterrent against a defection.
Moreover, we can rule out the unstable case where k∗∗ < k∗:
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, the cut-off point k∗ for a violating government to return
to the legal order and the cut-off point k∗∗ for a government to violate the legal
order satisfy k∗ < k∗∗.
Proof. See part b) of the proof of Proposition 3 in part 6.5 of the appendix.
21In this case k (minus a dynamic term) is not large enough for the government to continue
violating with the hight cost C but would be large enough to continue with the small cost C.
16
4.1 The Truncated Game
Consider the truncated game with a last period T = 2. In T , every government
defects if (5) is violated. Therefore, we have k∗∗′ = k0, E(V ncT ) = z(1 − θ) −
C(S, θ) + kT−1 and E(V cT ) = z. Now it is straightforward to show when the rule
of law economically matters. Comparing (5) and (6) for period T − 1, we find
that the latter condition results in a higher cut off point as the government always
perceives a positive risk of wanting to return to the constitution:
Proposition 3. For ∆ sufficiently great, the rule of law matters in the truncated
game with T = 2: The critical value above which the government defects under the
rule of law, k∗∗ is greater than the critical value in the absence of the rule of law,
k0.
Proof. See part 6.5 of the appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the rule of law has a deterring effect on a government
willing to defect: the critical value of the government’s temptation, the defector’s
rent k, is greater under the rule of law than in its absence. The condition for
this relation to hold is that the volatility of the defector’s rent, ∆, is sufficiently
great. This is intuitive: if the government - after observing kt−1 cannot rule out
the possibility that it wants to return to constitutional order once it learns kt, it
will be more cautious about a defection from the constitutional order. Note our
simplifying assumption that citizens - who move after the government - decide on
compliance based on kt which they observe with vanishing noise.
4.2 The Infinite Horizon Game
We construct an equilibrium for the infinite horizon case in the following way:
assume that all future governments follow a defection rule k∗∗′. Then determine
a switch back point k∗ and a defection value k∗∗ for the current government. We
show that there is a unique stationary value k∗∗ = k∗∗′ where each government
selects k∗∗ assuming that subsequent governments will select k∗∗ as well.22
Proposition 4. In the infinite horizon game there is a unique stationary equilib-
rium with value k∗∗ such that the government violates the constitution in t when
kt−1 > k∗∗ .
22This equilibrium is Markov-perfect in the sense that the choice of the government in period
t only depends on the pay-off relevant history as expressed in the state variable kt−1 and the
inherited constitutional state in t−1. Both elements of the history are ”pay-off relevant” because
the government can appropriate kt−1 in t when the immediately preceding constitutional history
is one of government defection.
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Proof. See part 6.6 of the appendix.
This equilibrium is a natural focal point of the infinite horizon game. As
demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3, its result extends to the infinite horizon
case:
Corollary to Proposition 3. For ∆ sufficiently great, the rule of law matters in
the stationary game: The critical value above which the government defects under
the rule of law, k∗∗ is greater than the critical value in the absence of the rule of
law, k0.
The corollary shows that the deterring effect of the rule of law stated in Propo-
sition 3 for a short planning horizon is replicated in the long run equilibrium of
this game.
5 Concluding Remarks
The mechanism that drives the stability of a constitution in a consolidated democ-
racy is the interaction between the legality requirement that results in a commit-
ment by a future constitutional government not to enforce unconstitutional laws
and the expectations of agents about (i) persistence of current order, and (ii)
agents’ resistance against constitutional violation. Thus, the interplay between
the legality requirement under the rule of law on the one hand, and expectations
of agents on the other, jointly produces a sufficiently high expected cost suffered
by an offending incumbent government, such that it supports a stable dynamic
constitutional equilibrium, in turn based on self-fulfilling expectations: a consoli-
dated democracy, to wit. Unconstitutional executive orders overturned by courts,
as witnessed in the Trump presidency in the United States, are a case in point.
Equally, if agents’ expectations favor complicity in constitutional violation – pos-
sibly, though not only, due to political history – then the rule of law mechanism
will fail to enforce the constitution, a feature of a transitory democracy with an
unstable constitution, as in Turkey under the Erdogan leadership.
An important assumption for the rule of law mechanism to be effective is that
agents share the belief that the natural fallback position after a violation of the
constitutional order is the pre-existing constitutional order itself. From this obser-
vation follow empirical predictions: greater confidence in the constitutional order
by major societal players will clearly strengthen constitutional stability. Potential
drivers of such confidence are a willingness not to obey illegal orders (η, in our
model), a stronger belief that other players will not obey illegal orders,23 or the
23That leaders with authoritarian tendencies care about these points can be seen from the
various cases where purges of the bureaucracy, military and judiciary occured.
18
belief that the original constitutional order is the natural fallback position after
any violation (i.e., agents believe that the model with the dynamic policy con-
straint correctly describes reality). For example, while in the Weimar Republic
the rule of law was well established and thought to protect against government
abuse (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018), it is likely that not only was the support of
the constitutional order weak among civil servants and judges, but that many
of them would have considered authoritarian government as a ”natural” state
of affairs.24 In order to distinguish the different drivers of behavior we need an
instrument which is directly related to the belief in the permanence of the con-
stitutional order. It is natural to assume that the belief in the permanence of
constitutional democracy increases with the length of constitutional history. Svo-
lik (2008) shows that the greater the age of a democracy, the greater the confidence
that the democracy is consolidated. He also shows that a military past is associ-
ated with non-consolidated democracy. A military past may be seen as a proxy
for alternative sources of legitimacy. Also, a history of military intervention will
undermine the belief that constitutional democracy is the natural fallback posi-
tion. Hence, our results are consistent with both of Svolik’s observations. More
generally, if competing modes of governance are seen as legitimate by the agents,
it will tend to weaken the self-stabilizing property of the rule-of-law mechanism
in a liberal democracy, rendering it more prone to successful populist challenges
as well as undemocratic subversion. The Spanish Republic before the civil war,
where monarchy and fascism provided alternative legitimization models provided
legitimate alternatives, is a case in point.
One issue that deserves attention is the robustness of the conclusions to weak-
ening of the assumptions of our model. The infinite planning horizon is a mere
convenience: nothing hinges on this, as shown in Pech (2009). A second, more
substantive issue is that the expectations of agents are of: continued force of the
current constitution, C, or government support of constitutional violation, V, or
if violation does occur, there is a return to the original constitution, R. What is
disallowed as a possibility, in our model, is a move to an amended constitution,
A, after a violation of the original, V. This could be a shortcoming of our inves-
tigation. It is, however, not a serious shortcoming because repeated amendments
after repeated violations of the original constitution have the markings of a tran-
sitory democracy, captured by V, in particular when they affect the ”core” of the
constitutional order.
What is needed is a model that would, for different configurations of expecta-
tions of the types of order that will prevail in future, and for distinct specifications
24MacElligott (1999) notes that the German judiciary in the 1930s overwhelmingly held an
authoritarian and ultra-conservative world view and that this was instrumental in undermining
resistance against fascism.
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of legality under the rule of law mechanism, support stable dynamic equilibria of
governance structures, among them, consolidated democracy, transitory democ-
racy, and outright autocracy. In a related module, different kinds of political
formations will, in turn, foster different patterns of economic growth and human
development. Once theory is as well developed as that, it will be a lot easier to
make sense of apparent association of attributes of different types of rule-of-law
violations commonplace in some countries, and the related variation in depriva-
tion of capability to function well suffered by the citizens of these nation states.
While we be some ways from as complete a model as this, it is not difficult to
imagine obtaining both the ‘autocracy under property rights violations’ result and
the ‘consolidated democracy based on rule of law abidance’ from the same general
model. This is an entirely tractable exercise, and would seem to be an appropriate
line of work to pursue.
From an alternative perspective, there are models that explain – as satisfy-
ing incentive compatibility conditions – equilibria such as stagnant equilibrium,
moderate-growth equilibrium, and rapid-growth equilibrium, as outcomes asso-
ciated respectively with going from much circumscribed to increasing extent of
protection of property-rights in business ownership. This is the connection be-
tween economic performance of a nation state and its rule-of-law abidance status,
as in Basu (1989) and Naqvi (1990) among others. Instead, this paper reports
on the link between rule-of-law abidance status of a nation state and its status
as consolidated democracy versus transitory democracy or autocracy. This work
is thus appropriately seen as dealing with the political economics of consolidated
democracies that resist populist challenges.
6 Appendix
6.1 Range of k: Proof of Lemma 2
In order to derive dominance regions for the citizens we need to determine the
range of k for which the decision of the government does not depend on non-
compliance. Let Dt(k) = (E(V
c|k)− E(V nct |k)). In the truncated game, the
government reforms in T − 1 if z(1− θ) + βDT (kT−1) > z(1− θ)−C(S, θ) + kT−1
where DT−1 decreases in kT−1 and C(S, θ) increases in θ. k = DT−1 +C(S, θ) and
k = DT−1 + C(S, θ) with C(S, θ) < C(S, θ), hence k < k. .
6.2 Critical Mass of Non-compliers: Proof of Lemma 3
Let φ := θ| (δ(θ, kt) = 0). Implicitly differentiating δ(φ) = 0 gives dφdkt = (1 −
β
∂(V cT−V ncT )
∂kt
)/( dδ
dφ
) > 0 where β
∂(V cT−V ncT )
∂kt
< 1 and dδ
dφ
> 0. That φ(k) = θ and
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φ(k) = θ follows from Lemma 1.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
6.3.1 Thresholds
Signal xi of kt which citizen i receives is equally distributed over (kt− ε, kt + ε). A
citizen i’ strategy has the form: evade taxes if xi ≤ ξi for some cut off point ξi. For
the moment, assume that the distribution of cut off points is exogenously given
according to ξ˜ with f(ξ) : ξ(i) → <+. If kt is the true state, then the probability
that x ≤ ξ is given by
W (ξ˜|kt) =
∫ x=kt+ε
x=kt−ε
1
2ε
∫ ξ=∞
ξ=x
f(ξ)dξdx. (10)
W (ξ˜|kt) is the share of citizens who have received a signal falling below their
individual cut off point ξ given that ξ˜ is distributed according to f . The term on
the right hand side gives the probability that ξ is higher than the signal in the
interval [kt−ε, kt+ε]. Now, if the true state is kt, then the government reform with
probability one if W (ξ˜|kt) > φ(kt). The minimum kt for which the government
does not reform is uniquely given by
k′t = min{kt|W (ξ˜|kt) ≤ φ(kt)}.(teta1)
Now, the probability which an agent who receives the message xi assigns to
the event that the government reforms is
ψi(W (kt, ξ˜
−i), φ(θ)|xi) =
∫ min(k′t,xi+ε)
xi−ε
1
2ε
dkt
where 1
2ε
is the density of the distribution of kt and ξ˜
−i is the distribution of
ξ without the agent i (which coincides with ξ˜ because the agent is atomic). We
get ψ by integrating over all kt which are in accordance with a violation by the
government and relating them to all kt which are possible from the observation
which has measure 1. Let ξi be the highest signal xi which elicits the reaction of
an agent, i.e. for which ψi(W (kt, ξ˜
−i), φ(kt)|xi) satisfies (critical) as an equality or
where P i assumes its critical value P i∗:
ξi = Max{xi|
∫ min(k′t,xi+ε)
xi−ε
1
2ε
dkt ≥ P i∗}. (11)
We obtain k∗ and ξ˜(k∗) as the limit of iteratively eliminating weakly dominated
strategies starting at the interval borders with ξ˜b0 = k − ε and ξ˜u0 = k + ε.
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6.3.2 Uniqueness of k∗
First, we establish that for any cut off point k∗ there is a unique distribution
ξ˜ such that (11) holds for every agent. Note that f(ξ) is common knowledge.
Let F (ξ) be the cumulative distribution of f(ξ) so that (4) can be represented
as W (ξ˜|k) = ∫ x=kt+ε
x=kt−ε
1
2ε
(1 − F (x))dx. Let ξ fulfill (11). Suppose there is ξ˜′ and
agent iL such that ξ′(iL) > ξ(iL). In order to fulfill W (ξ˜′|k∗) = φ(k∗) at the new
distribution, F (x) and F ′(x) must cross at least once for some ξ(i) < ξη. Say iL
is on the left hand side of the first such crossing so at the crossing, F (ξ′) cuts
F (ξ) from below. Let iC be the agent located at the crossing (i.e. for whom
ξ′(iC) = ξ(iC) and iR an agent on the right hand side of the first and to the left
of a second crossing (if it exists) with ξ′(iR) < ξ(iR). Assume that (11) holds for
iC . From (11), ψ(ξ′(iL))/ψ(ξ′(iR)) < ψ(ξ(iL))/ψ(ξ(iR)). Because ξ˜ satisfies (11)
for iL and iR, ξ˜′ does not.
To proof uniqueness of k∗, suppose there is another cut off point k′ < k∗ with
φ(k′) < φ(k∗). We construct the new (and unique) system of threshold values ξ˜′ in
two steps: First, calculate ξ˜′′ as an exact translation of ξ˜ by letting ξ′′ = ξ−k∗+k′.
Calculate the subjective probabilities with ξ′′ assuming that the critical value
is as before φ(k∗), i.e. ψi(W (k′, ξ˜′′), φ(k∗)|ξi) = ∫ k′
ξi−ε
1
2ε
dk. By construction, this
system of probabilities satisfies again (11) for each i. Because φ(k′) < φ(k∗) we
know that
ψi(W (k′, ξ˜′′), φ(k′)|xi) > ψi(W (k′, ξ˜′′), φ(k∗)|xi),
for all xi. In order to fulfill (11) with the true values ξ′ and φ(k′), ψi needs to
be lowered, i.e.
ψi(W (k′, ξ˜′′), φ(k′)|ξi′′) > ψi(W (θ′, ξ˜′), φ(k′)|ξi′)
Because ψi decreases in ξi it must be that ξi′ > ξi′′ for all i. Now suppose that
k′ is the true value. Then the set of non-compliers θ(k′) has increased compared
to the system ξ˜′′. With ξ˜′′ we have θ(k′) = W (ξ˜′′|k′) = φ(k∗) > φ(k′) because ξ˜′′
is an exact translation of ξ˜. With ξ˜′, we have W (ξ˜′|k′) > W (ξ˜′′|k′) because all
individual cut off point have moved to the right and more agents refuse to comply
for any given signal. Thus θ(k′) > φ(k′) contradicting that k′ is a switching point.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Before we proof the proposition, the following lemma is useful:
Lemma 7. (Approximate observations) Citizens correctly forecast the share of
non-compliers if the noise in the observation vanishes (ε −→ 0).
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Proof. From (10) we know that the share of agents who receive a signal short
of their threshold or - equivalently - the amount of non-compliers is W (ξ˜|k) =∫ x=k+ε
x=k−ε
1
2ε
∫ ξ=∞
ξ=x
f(ξ)dξdx if the true value is k. Now Ω(ξ˜|x) = ∫ x+ε
x−ε
1
2ε
W (ξ˜|k)dk is
the expected share of non-compliers if the observation is x. Taking the limit for
vanishing ε gives lim
ε→0
Ω(σ˜|x) = W (σ˜|k).
Given S, agent i refuses to comply if
ηi ≥ (1− P i)S. (12)
Let η = 0 the preference of the agent for whom (12) is fulfilled as an equality
for P i = 1. The threshold for this agent must be ξ = k∗ − ε: If she gets a signal
xi ≤ ξ she sets P i = 1 and refuses to comply.
Define θ the share of citizens with η′ ≥ η. If (12) is fulfilled for the agent with
ξ, it is also fulfilled for agents with η′ > η and ξ′ > ξ.
Now let ε → 0. Lemma 6 establishes that ξ → ξ′ and all agents with ηi ≥ η
refuse to comply.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
a) The Relationship between k∗ and k0 for T = 2.
Note that in both periods, k0 = θz+C and in the penultimate period, t = T−1,
k∗∗′ = k0.
From (4) we have
k − C + β[−θz − C + k] < 0 for k < k∗
k − C + β[−θz − C + k] ≥ 0 for k ≥ k∗
Assume k0 > k∗.
In this case we have for k ∈ (k∗, k0): k − C + βD ≥ 0 with D = k − k0 < 0
and for k = k0: k0 ≥ C. At k0 we have also: k0 = θz + C. Hence, θz ≥ C − C is
compatible with k∗ < k0.
Now assume k0 < k∗.
In this case we have for k ∈ (k0, k∗): k − C + βD < 0 with D = k − k0 > 0
and for k = k0: k0 < C. At k0, by definition k0 = θz + C. Hence, θz < C − C is
compatible with k∗ > k0.
b) The Relationship between k∗∗ and k∗.
Note that using (6) at k∗∗ we have
0 = −Eθz + (1− P )[k − C]− βDt+1(k) (13)
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where we have used Eθz =
∫
k<k∗ hθzdk+
∫
k≥k∗ hθzdk and P =
∫
k<k∗ hdk. Also
note that the right-hand-side of this equation increases in k.
From (4),
k − C − βDt+1(k) < 0 for k < k∗
k − C − βDt+1(k) ≥ 0 for k ≥ k∗ (14)
Define for → 0: Θ(k) = k−C−βDt+1 for k < k∗ and Θ(k) = k−C−βDt+1 for
k ≥ k∗. The graph of Θ is monotonically increasing in k and upper-semicontinuous.
In order to determine the location of k∗, define for  > 0, Θ∗(k) = k−C(S, θ)−
βDt+1. At k
∗(), the relationship k∗() − C∗ − βDt+t(k) = 0 holds. Comparing
with −Eθz + (1− P )(k − C − βDt+1(k) shows that at k∗ the latter expression is
smaller than zero. Hence, for  > 0, k∗() > k∗∗. This relationship holds for all
 > 0.
Moreover, k∗ → k∗() as  → 0: Because agents have certain expectations for
k 6∈ [k∗()−, k∗()+], Θ∗(k) coincides with Θ(k) for k 6∈ [k∗()−, k∗()+] with
Θ∗ increasing in the interval as non-compliance θ increases, crossing the zero-line
in k∗ (see figure 1).
Hence, there is a sequence such that k∗ → lim(→ 0)[k∗()] < k∗∗.
c) Show that k0 < k∗∗
Suppose k0 ≥ k∗∗. We can use θz ≤ Eθz. For the truncated two-period game,
we have DT ≤ 0 at k∗∗ because DT is increasing in k and DT (k0) = 0 as k∗∗′ = k0.
Therefore, k∗∗ = 1
1−P [Eθz−βDT ] +C > θz+C = k0 for P > 0, contradicting our
assumption that k0 ≥ k∗∗.
In the stationary game we have D(k∗∗) = 0, hence k∗∗ = 1
1−PEθz + C >
θz + C = k0 for P > 0.
So the the rule of law is effective if P > 0 which is fulfilled for k ∈ (k∗−∆, k∗+
∆) and, hence, for ∆ sufficiently great.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
In this proof we proceed as follows: Lemma 8 and 9 extend the uniqueness result
on k∗ of Lemma 1 to the infinite horizon model. Subsequently we show that there
uniquely exists a fixed point k∗∗ = k∗∗′ for which D(k) = 0. This proves the
proposition.
Note that with ε→ 0, x∗ does not depend on the initial condition kt−1.
Lemma 8. D(k) is non-increasing in k.
Proof. For k < k∗ −∆, dD(k)
dk
= 0 and for k ≥ k∗ + ∆, dD(k)
dk
= −1. So consider a
right-ward shift from kt−1 to k′t−1 k ∈ (k∗ −∆, k∗ + ∆). Because the distribution
function H ′ stochastically dominates H, we have
∫
kt<k
∗ h(k)dkt
dkt−1
< 0.
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Figure 1: The graph of −Eθz + (1− P )(k−C)− βDt+1 intersects with the 0-line
on the right-hand-side of the intersection of Θ∗(k). Hence, k∗∗ > k∗
.
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Moreover, because E(kt) = kt−1,
d
∫
h(k)dkt
dkt−1
= 1,
d
∫
kt≥k∗ h(k)dkt
dkt−1
> 0. We also
observe that for kt ≥ k∗ we have k ≥ C + βD with D ≥ 0 for kt ∈ (k∗, k∗∗), hence
k ≥ C must also hold for kt > k∗∗. Hence, there is always θ small enough, such
that the bracketed term in (9) is positive and ∂D
∂kt−1
< 0
Lemma 9. In a stationary game the switching point k∗ is unique.
Proof. By Lemma 8, D(k) decreases in k. We have to show that k > k. Suppose
that k ≤ k. Because D(k) is non-increasing in k, D(k) ≥ D(k) follows. But in
that case, by Lemma 1 it must be k > k, a contradiction. Therefore, k > k and
k∗ is a switching point by Proposition 2 and this point is unique.
Let X = k∗∗′ and Y = k∗∗. Using (9) and (8a) we can now implicitly define
the mapping Γ: R→ R as follows:
By Lemma 6 we can focus on the case X > k∗, Y > k∗. Observing Y = µ =∫ k∗
hktdkt +
∫
k∗ hktdkt we can write:
Dt+1(Y ) = Eθz +
∫
k∗
hCdkt − β
∫ X
k∗
hDt+2dkt − Y +
∫ k∗
hktdkt = ϕ(X, Y ) = 0.
(15)
dY
dX
= −ϕX
ϕY
= hD−1 ≤ 0 for X > k∗ with D ≥ 0 so ϕ intersects the X = Y -line
from above. As ϕ(X, Y ) is also continuous, in particular as X → k∗, the mapping
has a unique fixed point.
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